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Abstract
This article examines the participation of consumers in adjustment
markets for electricity power. These markets allow market participants
to respond to random supply shocks occurring after quantities have
been contracted. Under perfect competition, opening the adjustment
market to consumers always increase ex post efficiency, hence welfare,
as expected. However, this result is not robust to strategic behavior by
consumers who hold private information on their value for electricity
power. We prove that under such information asymmetry, allowing
consumers to enter the adjustment market may reduce welfare. This
arises because suppliers limit the information rents they must abandon
by proposing inefficient ex ante retail contracts. If the value of ex
post efficiency gains due to consumers’ participation is low, whereas
the information distortion is high, the overall net effect is a welfare
decrease.
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1 Introduction
Historically, electricity demand was not responsive to variations in wholesale
prices. As liquid wholesale markets for electric power did not exist in most
countries until the early 1990s, there was no price signal for users to respond
to. Furthermore, users were accustomed to consume power to respond to
their needs, not to the opportunity cost of power at any given time. Over
the last 20 years, demand response has become a technical reality. Liquid
wholesale markets now exist in most countries, providing the value of power
at different times and locations. Most large industrial and commercial users
have meters that enable them and their supplier to track their real time
consumption. Similar "smart"meters are being deployed for residential and
professional users in most jurisdictions.
Demand response has the potential to transform how power systems are
designed and operated. For example, if enough users reduce their demand
as price increases, there may no longer be a need to implement involuntary
curtailment, hence the notion of capacity adequacy, which currently stands
at the core of most electric power markets’ design, may no longer be relevant.
For this reason, demand response has received significant attention from
academics and policy makers in Europe and North America1.
In most industries, consumers respond to demand by purchasing on the
spot market and adjusting their consumption to the spot price. The elec-
tricity industry is different, since most consumers have fixed-price contracts
with their supplier, which specify a price independent of the spot price.
Rather than reacting to real time price, demand response is thus customers
reselling into an adjustment market the Megawatt-hours they are entitled
to withdraw2.
The first issue that has attracted attention of academics and policy mak-
ers is the design of adjustment markets, in particular the price customers
must pay to have access to the market and the price they receive when re-
1See in particular Borenstein et al. (2002) and Hogan (2009).
2Demand response is not demand management. In the latter, consumers buy electricity
power at low price because they accept the risk to be disconnected by their provider. Ex
post, they are not the decision maker. Oren (2013) presents a rich historical perspective
of this type of arrangement. Interruptible contracts can be promoted by means of option
mechanisms, as shown in Kamat & Oren (2002). Demand response is "A reduction in the
consumption of electric energy by retail customers from their expected consumption in
response to an increase in the price of electric energy or to incentive payments designed
to induce lower consumption of electric energy." (USCA, 2012b).
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selling power. As discussed in Section 5, it has led to contentious debates in
many jurisdictions3.
Even if the adjustment market is well-designed, a second issue of inter-
est is consumers’ potential strategic behavior. Customers are paid for the
difference between the consumption-that-would-have-happened, called their
baseline, and their actual consumption. They thus have incentives to inflate
that baseline. In a particularly illuminating example, in June 2013, the Fed-
eral Energy Regulatory Commission fined a demand response operator for
wrongly claiming, on behalf of its client the Maryland Stadium Authority,
that it reduced its electricity usage from the baseline in 2009 and 2010 at
the main Baltimore baseball stadium. Specifically, the enquiry established
that the operator’s engineers turned on the lights at the baseball stadium
to create false demand that it was then paid to reduce4.
To address this issue, a first possibility is to develop algorithms that
provide a robust estimation of the baseline. While this approach may work
for some customers, it may not apply to all. Another approach is to recognize
that some consumers will always have better information than retailers on
their baseline, hence to design contracts that explicitly acknowledge this
private information. This article is the first to do so, i.e. to explicitly model
consumers’ strategic behavior using contract theory5. As will be discussed
below, the analysis yields new and unexpected results.
The situation we examine is as follows. Ex ante, suppliers and consumers
agree on bilateral supply contracts. Then, a random shock occurs. Demand
and supply must then be rebalanced ex post, i.e., after the shock is realized.
We examine the impact of introducing an adjustment market on both ex post
and ex ante efficiency, i.e., we compare outcomes when compensation for the
shock is provided solely by increased production, and when it is provided by
an adjustment market in which producers and customers participate.
The analysis incorporates two realistic features of the electric power in-
dustry. First, customers have private information on their value for elec-
tricity, which gives them the opportunity to behave strategically. Second,
contrary to most papers dealing with demand curtailment, the contract price
is not given by a condition of free entry with a uniform price inefficiently
3See in particular Ruff (2002) and USCA (2012a, 2012b, 2014).
4http://www.theenergyfix.com/2013/07/25/two-ferc-settlements-illustrate-attempts-
to-game-demand-response-programs/#sthash.AdXi8tK9.dpbs
5See Laffont and Martimort (2002).
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fixed at the average cost of electricity. Instead, it arises endogenously form
the bargaining between retailers and consumers.
Standard economic analysis suggests that, if the adjustment market is
well-designed and frictionless, resale is ex post efficient: consumers resell
power precisely up to the point where their marginal value for power equals
the price in the adjustment market6. Furthermore, if there are no frictions
in the ex ante retail market, ex post demand response does not distort the
ex ante contract either, which is then ex ante efficient. In other words,
neither customers nor suppliers have an incentive to distort the ex ante
contract from the efficient one when consumers are allowed to intervene
in the adjustment process. Opening the adjustment market to customers
thus increases welfare. This intuition is confirmed by the analysis, and
summarized in Lemma 1.
However, the result does not necessarily hold under imperfect informa-
tion. Suppose there are two types of customers. Contract theory sug-
gests suppliers must leave an information rent to customers with the higher
willingness-to-pay (high type), and reduce consumption of the low type cus-
tomers. We prove that, while the ex ante contract remains efficient for high
type customers, it is no longer efficient for low type. Thus, the possibility
of customers’ strategic behavior, which gives rise to the information rent,
defeats ex ante efficiency of adjustment markets (Proposition 1).
Finally, we examine the net welfare impact of customers participation in
the adjustment market. We prove that, in some instances, the information
distortion for low type customers is so large that opening the adjustment
market to customers reduces welfare (Proposition 2).
The policy implication of our work is not that policy makers should
abandon adjustment markets for fear of inefficiency. Rather policy makers
and regulators ought to be aware that consumers will exert strategic behavior
when possible, and should therefore design markets that accommodate this
strategic behavior.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the notations
and presents the perfect information benchmark. Section 3 discusses the
case of asymmetric information. Section 4 analyses the welfare impact of
opening the adjustment market to customers on welfare. In Section 5 we
6See for example Chao (2010) and Crampes and Léautier (2012).
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derive some lessons for regulators. Section 6 concludes.
2 The benchmark model
We consider a two-stage game. In the first stage, each customer (she) faces a
supplier (he) who offers her a contract, i.e., a pair (quantity of kWh, payment).7
The customer accepts or rejects the offer, depending on her characteristics
and outside options.
In the second stage, there are two possible states of nature: either (i) all
generation units are operational so that the contracts signed during stage
1 are implemented, or (ii) some units are out of order. In this case, an
adjustment market is opened where producers with generation reserves and
customers holding withdrawal rights compete. Adjusted contracts are then
implemented.
We first specify the model and then determine the retail and adjustment
equilibria under symmetric information.
2.1 Setup and notation
Suppliers This article assumes that electricity suppliers are in exclusive
bilateral negotiations with their customers in the contract market, while the
adjustment market (described later) is perfectly competitive. This is the
case if incumbent retailers have de facto monopoly in their (former) service
territory, while the adjustment market covers multiple service territories,
which seems to be a reasonable approximation in many North American
and European markets. First, empirical evidence suggests that electricity
customers are reluctant to switch suppliers.8 Assuming that incumbent
retailers engage in exclusive bilateral negotiations with their customers in
the contract market is a reasonable approximation of the contracting stage.
Second, in most US markets, the geographical footprint of the Independent
7 In most countries we know, consumers pay a flat unit price per kWh, and they are
limited in their instantaneous demand by the capacity of their meters. Along the day,
the week, the month, consumption varies so that the bill varies. In the paper, to keep
things simple, we consider a one period model, or equivalently, a multiperiod model with
stationary needs. Then, consumers are able to decide on the total quantity they want
to consume and the total expenditure they are ready to pay. In a slightly more complex
model, the value attribute of the contract could be the unit price instead of the total
payment.
8See Deller et al. 2014, and Wilson and Waddams (2012).
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System Operator, which administers the adjustment market, encompasses
the service territories of a dozen or more utilities. Similarly in Great Britain,
the dispatch is national, while at the "big six" retailers are descendants of
the twelve Regional Electricity Company.
Each supplier offers a representative consumer a contract (q, t), where q
is the quantity and t the total payment. If the consumer rejects the offer,
she receives net utility U , and the supplier receives no profit. The contract
is further specified below.
Producers The suppliers are vertically integrated into production. This
is a reasonable assumption, as many suppliers produce most of the energy
they sell. The marginal cost of producing output x is denoted c (x), and is
assumed to be non decreasing, c′ (x) ≥ 0.
Consumers Consumers’ surplus is S (q, θ), where q is the quantity con-
sumed and θ the consumer’s type. The function S (q, θ) is increasing and
concave in q, increasing in θ and satisfies the Spence-Mirrlees condition
(Marginal Rate of Substitution increasing in type):
Sqθ (q, θ) ≡ ∂
2S (q, θ)
∂q∂θ
> 0. (1)
Consumers know better than suppliers their value for power, i.e., θ is
consumer’s private information.
Production outage and adjustment After contracting has taken place
between customers and suppliers and before delivery, a random shock occurs,
that may reduce production9. The shock is µ ≥ 0, distributed according to
the density function f (.) on [0,K], where K is exogenous. The probability
that actual production is equal to contracted production is Pr (µ = 0) =
(1− β) > 0.
We assume the shock µ > 0 can always be compensated, i.e., there
is enough production reserve and demand response to balance supply and
demand in the adjustment market. Without loss of generality, we suppose
9Note that the need for rebalancing could come from a unexpected increase in con-
sumption. Consumers with low utility could also participate efficiently in the adjustment
process.
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that the outage affects the least expensive production units.10 Then, ex post
the total cost to produce quantity q when outage is µ is
C (q, µ) =
 µ+q
µ
c (x) dx,
and the marginal cost of production is
∂C (q, µ)
∂q
= c (µ+ q) .
Ex ante, the expected total cost of producing q is
Eµ [C (q, µ)] = (1− β)C (q, 0) + β
 K
0
C (q, µ) f (µ) dµ,
and the expected marginal cost is
Eµ [c (q + µ)] = (1− β) c (q) + β
 K
0
c (q + µ) f (µ) dµ.
We assume the adjustment market is perfectly competitive: a large num-
ber of producers/suppliers and customers (when allowed) are price takers
when bidding produced or curtailed volumes.
2.2 Perfect information benchmark
In this section, we suppose that each supplier knows perfectly the charac-
teristic of each of his customers, θ.
2.2.1 No demand participation in adjustment
Consider first the situation where suppliers/producers must balance the elec-
tric system without the customers’ help. When failure occurs they have no
choice but to turn on more expensive production units to meet their com-
mitments. If supplier i suffers shortage µi after contracting on (ti, qi) , he
produces the missing quantity by using his own reserve or buys from the
adjustment market at price pa, where other producers will sell additional
production.
10For a given size of the shortage µ, the ranking of the missing plants in the merit order
is indifferent. The marginal cost is just "shifted to the left" by µ.
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Since the adjustment market is assumed to be perfectly competitive, pa
is equal to marginal cost c (q + µ). We assume that all producers are hit by
an identical shock. Thus, when customers are not allowed to bid, the adjust-
ment is neutral in terms of income for producers, since there is no trade to
compensate µ since each is producing with his own reserves. Consequently,
the ex ante expected profit of any supplier is simply (t− Eµ [C (q, µ)]).
At the contracting stage, the supplier maximizes his profit, under the
constraint that the customer’s net utility exceeds her reservation utility U .
This leads the supplier to maximize the net surplus from the transaction,
i.e., to set t = S (q (θ) , θ) + U and then to choose q that solves
max
q
S (q, θ)− Eµ [C (q, µ)] .
If suppliers had less market power, they would would leave a positive rent
to customers, determined in equilibrium (see Stole, 2007). This would lead
to much more complex modelling, but would not modify much the main
insights of this article. We thus make the simplifying assumption that the
rent left to consumers is constant. Without loss of generality, we normalize
it to zero.
The quantity produced and sold is q (θ) determined by the first-order
condition
P (q (θ) , θ) = Eµ [c (q (θ) + µ)] , (2)
where P
def
= Sq is the inverse demand function.
Since the ex ante contract is designed taking into account the expected
shock, it is almost never ex post efficient. More precisely, denoting q∗ (θ, µ)
the ex post efficient production and µˆ the production shock such that c (q∗ (θ, µˆ) + µˆ) =
Eµ [c (q (θ) + µ)], we show in Appendix A that contracted production is lower
than ex post optimal production for a small production shock (µ < µˆ).
Conversely, contracted production is too high for a large production shock
(µ > µˆ).
2.2.2 Demand participation in adjustment
Suppose now customers can reduce their demand to help balancing the pro-
duction shortage µ. Specifically, after she has paid t to buy q, customer θ
can resell a share qca on the adjustment market at unit price pa. Produc-
8
ers also participate in the adjustment market by selling qsa at unit price pa.
Neither qca nor pa is under the control of suppliers. The former is chosen
by consumers, the latter is determined by competition on the adjustment
market.
We solve the problem backwards, examining first the ex post adjustment
and second the ex ante retail contract.
Equilibrium in the adjustment market If there is an energy shortage
µ > 0, given the contracted quantity q and the price pa on the adjustment
market, consumer θ solves
max
qca
S (q − qca, θ) + paqca
s.t. qca ≤ q
.
Assuming an interior solution, the first-order condition is
pa − P (q − qca, θ) = 0⇔ qca (pa, q, θ) = q −D (pa, θ) ,
where D (pa, θ) is the quantity consumed by θ given the adjustment price
pa.
The adjustment market determines the net consumption (q − qca). Quan-
tities q and qca are complements: an increase in q increases qca one-for-one
∂qca
∂q = 1

. This is a consequence of the fact that consumers pay for the
entire quantity they contract ex ante (q), and not only for their net ex post
consumption (q − qca).
Symmetrically, producers solve
max
qsa
paq
s
a −
 q+qsa
µ
c (x) dx
Assuming an interior solution, the first-order condition is
pa − c (q + qsa) = 0⇔ qsa (pa, q) = γ (pa)− q
where γ (.) = c−1 (.). Quantities contracted and quantities in the adjust-
ment market are substitutes: an increase in q decreases qsa one-for-one
∂qsa
∂q = −1

.
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The wholesale equilibrium price is the solution to
qca (pa, q, θ) + qsa (pa, q) = µ⇔ γ (pa)−D (pa, θ) = µ.
For a given µ, the equilibrium price is pa (µ, θ), increasing in both argu-
ments11. A large θ means strong willingness to consume, thus a low will-
ingness to sell on the wholesale market, pushing the adjustment equilibrium
price upwards. Also observe that the price in the adjustment market does
not depend on the contracted quantity q.
At equilibrium, offers are
qca (µ, q, θ)
def
= qca (pa (µ, θ) , q, θ) = q −D (pa (µ, θ) , θ)
by curtailed consumers, and
qsa (µ, q, θ)
def
= qsa (pa (µ, θ) , q) = γ (pa (µ, θ))− q
by reserve providers.
Equilibrium in the retail market The expected gross surplus of con-
sumer type θ who contracts q in the retail market, and sells qca (µ, q, θ) at
price pa (µ, θ) in the adjustment market is
u (q, θ) = Eµ [S (q − qca (µ, q, θ) , θ) + pa (µ, θ) qca (µ, q, θ)] . (3)
The consumer pays t for the entire quantity q. This then gives her the right
to sell back qca at price pa.
For future reference, note that
∂u
∂q
= Eµ

P (q − qca (µ, q, θ) , θ)

1− ∂q
c
a
∂q

+ pa (µ, θ)
∂qca
∂q

= (1− β)P (q, θ) + βEµ>0 [pa (µ, θ)]
since qca = 0 for µ = 0, which occurs with probability (1− β), and ∂q
c
a
∂q = 1
for µ > 0. Increasing q generates marginal gross surplus P (q, θ) if no failure
occurs. It has no impact on the surplus realized in the adjustment market,
since consumption D (pa, θ) = q − qca (pa, q, θ) depends solely on the price
11See the proof in Appendix B.
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in the adjustment market, and not on contracted purchases q. Thus, if a
failure occurs, the only impact of purchasing an additional unit is enabling
the customer to resell it at price pa (µ, θ) in the adjustment market.
As before, the supplier chooses t (θ) = u (q (θ) , θ), hence expected profit
from type θ is
π (q, θ) = u (q, θ)+Eµ
	
pa (µ, θ) q
s
a (µ, q, θ)−
 q+qsa(µ,q,θ)
µ
c (x)dx− pa (µ, θ)µ


.
Observe that
∂π
∂q
=
∂u
∂q
+ Eµ

pa (µ, θ)
∂qsa
∂q
− c (q + qsa (µ, q, θ))

1 +
∂qsa
∂q

= (1− β) (P (q, θ)− c (q)) .
Total production in the adjustment market (q + qsa) is solely determined
by the adjustment market price. Contracting an additional unit only pre-
vents the producer from reselling it at price pa (µ, θ) in the adjustment mar-
ket if µ > 0. Since the supplier internalizes the consumer’s surplus, these
effects cancel out. The marginal value of contracted quantity is thus solely
its value if no production failure occurs, which is simply price minus mar-
ginal cost.
This analysis yields the following:
Lemma 1 Under perfect information, opening the adjustment market to
customers leads to production efficiency, whether production failure occurs
or not.
Proof. Since there is no imperfection in adjustment markets, they are effi-
cient if µ > 0 by the first welfare theorem. If µ = 0, no adjustment market
takes place, and the production agreed-on during the retail contracting phase
takes place. It is efficient since
∂π
∂q
= (1− β) (P (q, θ)− c (q)) = 0⇔ P (q (θ) , θ) = c (q (θ)) .
Lemma 1 strongly militates for opened adjustment markets. When de-
mand cannot participate, suppliers anticipate the possibility of production
11
failures, and incorporate it in their offers. Thus, consumption is (almost)
never ex post efficient, either too high or too low.
Allowing demand to enter the adjustment market eliminates that in-
efficiency. If production failure occurs, the adjustment market is ex post
efficient. Maybe more surprisingly, if no failure occurs, efficiency also arises:
anticipating the impact of the adjustment market, suppliers make the opti-
mal offer, which is realized if no adjustment occurs.
Thus, demand participation in adjustment market improves welfare un-
der perfect information. As we will see below, this property is not guaranteed
under asymmetric information.
3 Contracts under asymmetric information
We now assume that consumers’ preference θ can take two values, θ¯ or θ,
with θ¯ > θ. Each consumer knows her type. Suppliers place probability α
on the consumer type being θ¯.
3.1 No demand participation in adjustment
As in the previous section, each producer covering energy shortage with his
own production plant, ex ante he chooses the pair of contracts (t (θ) , q (θ))θ∈{θ¯,θ}
to maximize his expected profit:
max
(t(θ),q(θ))
θ∈{θ¯,θ}
Eθ [t (θ)− Eµ [C (q (θ) , µ)]]
From the literature on incentives12, we know that the supplier must
ensure each type is willing to accept the contract (Individual Rationality),
and select the right contract (Incentive Compatibility). Standard analysis
then yields payments
t (θ) = S (q (θ) , θ) and t

θ¯

= S

q

θ¯

, θ¯
− S q (θ) , θ¯− S (q (θ) , θ) .
No rent is left to the low type customer θ, while the high type customer
receives an information rent equal to the difference in surplus between her
and the low type, at the low type consumption.
12See for example Laffont & Martimort (2002).
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Replacing t

θ¯

and t (θ) by their above values in the supplier’s expected
profit and differentiating with respect to q

θ¯

and q (θ) yields:
P

q

θ¯

, θ¯

= Eµ

c

q

θ¯

+ µ

, (4)
and
P (q (θ) , θ) = Eµ [c (q (θ) + µ)] +
α
1− α

P

q (θ) , θ¯
− P (q (θ) , θ) . (5)
We obtain the usual results of the literature on incentives:
1. there is no distortion at the top: q

θ¯

is such that the marginal surplus
is equal to the expected marginal cost, and
2. the quantity offered to the low-type is reduced sufficiently to prevent
the high-type from purchasing the low-type bundle.
The price charged to the low type is equal to the expected marginal cost
plus the information distortion, which is positive by condition (1). There-
fore, as in the symmetric information case, there is a "µ−distortion"in all
contracts, since in the absence of ex post demand adjustment, the contracted
quantity q must be produced.
3.2 Demand participation in adjustment
The equilibrium in the adjustment market is unchanged compared to the
perfect information case.
Given the consumer’s supply function on the wholesale market qca (θ, q, pa),
if qca is observable, the producer who fixes q and knows the market price pa
can infer the value of θ. However, information is revealed ex post, after the
wholesale market reaches equilibrium. Ex ante, when q and t are fixed, the
producer knows neither qca nor pa. We now examine the contract market.
Surplus and profit The gross expected surplus of consumer type θ who
contracts q in the retail market, and will sell qca (µ, q, θ) at price pa (µ, θ) in
the adjustment market is u (q, θ) defined by equation (3).
The information rent corresponding to the contracted quantity q is
R (q) = u

q, θ¯
− u (q, θ) . (6)
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For future reference, note that
∂R
∂q
= (1− β) P q, θ¯− P (q, θ)+ β
1− βEµ>0

pa

µ, θ¯
− pa (µ, θ) .
The marginal information rent is the sum of two terms. First, the informa-
tion rent if no failure occurs

P

q, θ¯
− P (q, θ), which is the same term as
without an adjustment market.
The second term is the information rent if failure occurs. This term is
slightly more surprising: the previous analysis has shown that consumers
behave truthfully in the adjustment market, i.e., they consume according
to their type. Why should they receive a rent in the adjustment market?
The answer to this apparent paradox is that the rent is received in the con-
tract market, not in the adjustment market: anticipating they will behave
truthfully in the adjustment market (hence receive no information rent),
consumers require an additional rent in the contract market.
Both marginal information rents are positive. There is no a priori guar-
antee that the rent is higher than without an adjustment market

P

q, θ¯
− P (q, θ).
However, as we will next see, the distortion is larger.
Supplier program Each producer chooses the pair of retail contracts
(t (θ) , q (θ))θ∈{θ,θ} to maximize his expected profit:
max
(t(θ),q(θ))
θ∈{θ,θ}
Eθ
	
t (θ) + Eµ
	
pa (µ, θ) q
s
a (µ, q (θ) , θ)−
 q(θ)+qsa(µ,q(θ),θ)
µ
c (x) dx− pa (µ, θ)µ



subject to individual rationality constraints
u

q

θ¯

, θ¯
− t θ¯ ≥ 0 and u (q (θ) , θ)− t (θ) ≥ 0,
and incentive compatibility constraints
u

q

θ¯

, θ¯
−t θ¯ ≥ u q (θ) , θ¯−t (θ) and u (q (θ) , θ)−t (θ) ≥ u q θ¯ , θ−t θ¯ .
The Spence-Mirrlees condition holds, since
∂2u
∂θ∂q
= (1− β) ∂P
∂θ
+ βEµ>0

∂pa
∂θ
(µ, θ)

> 0
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by condition (1) and ∂pa∂θ > 0.
Again, we know from the established results of incentives theory that
the payment of type θ and θ¯ are
t (θ) = u (q (θ) , θ) and t

θ¯

= u

q

θ¯

, θ¯
−R (q (θ)) ,
where R (.) is the information rent defined by (6).
Producer’s expected profit is
Π = α

π

q

θ¯

, θ¯
−R (q (θ))+ (1− α)π (q (θ) , θ)
The first-order condition with respect to q

θ¯

is
∂Π
∂q

θ¯
 = 0 =⇒ α (1− β) P q θ¯ , θ¯− c q θ¯ = 0.
Consequently the optimal quantity offered to type θ¯ is defined by
P

q

θ¯

, θ¯

= c

q

θ¯

. (7)
The first order derivative with respect to q (θ) is
∂Π
∂q (θ)
= (1− α) (1− β) (P (q (θ) , θ)− c (q (θ)))
−α (1− β) P q (θ) , θ¯− P (q (θ) , θ)+ βEµ>0 pa µ, θ¯− pa (µ, θ) .
By setting the above derivative equal to 0, the optimal quantity offered to
type θ is implicitly defined by
P (q (θ) , θ) = c (q (θ)) +
α
1− α
 
P

q (θ) , θ¯
− P (q (θ) , θ)
+ β1−βEµ>0

pa

µ, θ¯
− pa (µ, θ)

(8)
This yields the following:
Proposition 1 Suppose that customers have private information on their
type. The adjustment market, if it is opened to customers, is always efficient.
This efficiency translates into ex ante contract efficiency for the high-type
consumer. However, the contract offered to the low type consumer is not ex
ante efficient. Furthermore, the information distortion is higher than when
customers do not participate in the adjustment market.
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Proof. The proposition follows immediately from the above derivations.
The adjustment market when opened to customers is efficient. Equation
(7) proves that the retail contract is ex ante efficient for the high type, and
equation (8) proves that the retail contract is ex ante inefficient for the low
type. Since

P

q (θ) , θ
− P (q (θ) , θ) > 0 and pa µ, θ¯− pa (µ, θ) > 0,
the total information distortion is higher than the information distortion
without customers in the adjustment market, P

q (θ) , θ
 − P (q (θ) , θ) in
equation (5).
Optimal contracting requires there is no distortion for the high type
consumer. The optimal contracted quantity, presented in equation (7), is
therefore ex ante efficient. If no failure occurs (µ = 0), the contract is also
efficient ex post.
For the low type consumer, analysis from Lemma 1 shows that increasing
q (θ) has no direct impact on the supplier profits if the adjustment market
is opened to customers. On the other hand, it has an impact on profits if
no failure occurs (probability (1− β)) and on the information rent, which
is proportional to (1− β). Thus, the marginal value of q (θ) is proportional
to (1− β), and the information distortion is higher than with a limited
adjustment market.
If the adjustment market accepts energy demanders, this ex ante distor-
tion has no impact, since the market is ex post efficient. On the other hand,
if no failure occurs, this inefficient retail contract is executed, which reduces
welfare, as we see next.
4 Welfare comparison
Absent the demand side in the adjustment market, production is (almost)
never optimal: too low if the production shock is small, too high otherwise.
When adjustment can come from demande response, production is optimal
for the high type consumer, and for the low type consumer when µ > 0.
Only for low type consumer when µ = 0 is production not optimal.
One would therefore expect that opening the adjustment market in-
creases welfare. However, this is not always the case: depending on the
value of the parameters, the information distortion for low type consumers
when µ = 0 can outweigh the gains.
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This effect is illustrated using a linear specification: marginal cost and
inverse demand are linear c (x) = cx with c > 0, and P (q, θ) = a (θ) − bq,
where a (θ) > 0, b > 0, and a
′
(θ) > 0 to respect condition (1). While a
general analysis is possible, the notation would be cumbersome. The linear
specification leads to simple expressions, and provides the key economic
intuition.
No customer in the adjustment market Condition (4) becomes
q

θ¯

=
a

θ¯
− cE [µ]
b+ c
,
while condition (5) yields
q (θ) =
a (θ)− cE [µ]− α1−α

a

θ¯
− a (θ)
b+ c
<
a (θ)− cE [µ]
b+ c
.
These expressions illustrate the two distortions discussed in this analysis.
First is the production distortion: the average cost cE [µ] and not the re-
alized cost cµ is used to compute the contracted quantity. As previously
mentioned, production is almost never optimal ex post. Second is the infor-
mation distortion: consumption for low type consumers is further distorted
by the information rent.
To guarantee that type θ is served, we assume that
a (θ)− cE [µ] ≥ α
1− α

a

θ¯
− a (θ) .
Define y = E[µ]
a(θ) and x =
α
1−α
a(θ¯)−a(θ)
a(θ) . The variable y is a measure of the
production distortion, and x is a measure of the information distortion. The
above condition can be rewritten as
a (θ) (1− x− y) ≥ 0⇔ (x+ y) ≤ 1. (9)
Equation (9) imposes a higher bound on the sum of the two distortions.
We continue to assume that production failure when it occurs affects the
least expensive units, as this leads to a simple expression of the expected
net surplus: since marginal cost and inverse demand are linear, the expected
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net surplus Wna is a triangle. Specifically, algebraic manipulations yield
2 (b+ c)Wna = Eθ

(a (θ)− cE [µ])2

−(1− α)

(a (θ)− cE [µ])2 − (a (θ) (1− x)− cE [µ])
2
.
Both distortions reduce welfare compared to the optimum. Standard
analysis shows that the expected welfare if production was ex post op-
timal is
EθEµ[(a(θ)−cµ)2]
2(b+c) . The production distortion reduces welfare since
(a (θ)− cE [µ])2 < Eµ

(a (θ)− cµ)2

by convexity of the function x 
→ x2.
The information distortion reduces welfare since (a (θ) (1− x)− cE [µ])2 <
(a (θ)− cE [µ])2.
If we assumed that failure could affect other units on the supply curve,
equilibrium prices and quantities would not be modified, since they depend
on marginal costs. On the other hand, net surplus would be higher, since
more expensive units would fail. The surplus reduction from the production
distorsion would be lower, which would strenghten our results, as will be
shown below.
Customers in the adjustment market Price in the adjustment market
pa (µ, θ) is defined by the equality of demand µ and the supply by consumers
and producers
pa (µ, θ) =
c
c+ b
(a (θ) + bµ) ,
hence
Eµ>0

pa

µ, θ¯
− pa (µ, θ) = c
c+ b

a

θ¯
− a (θ) .
Contracted quantity for the high type (equation (7)) and the low type (equa-
tion (8)) are
q

θ¯

=
a

θ¯

b+ c
and q (θ) = a (θ)
1− (1 + λ)x
b+ c
,
where λ = β1−β
c
c+b . To insure the low type is served, we impose
(1 + λ)x ≤ 1. (10)
If µ > 0, the adjustment market is ex post efficient. Welfare is
Waµ>0 =
(a (θ)− cµ)2
2 (b+ c)
.
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If µ = 0, the contracted quantity is efficient for the high type, distorted for
the low type. Welfare is
W aµ=0 =
αa2

θ¯

+ (1− α) (a (θ) (1− (1 + λ)x))2
2 (b+ c)
.
Thus, expected welfare W a is
2 (b+ c)Wa = β

αE

a

θ¯
− cµ2 /µ > 0+ (1− α)E (a (θ)− cµ)2 /µ > 0
+(1− β)

αa

θ¯
2
+ (1− α) (a (θ) (1− (1 + λ)x))2

= EθEµ

(a (θ)− cµ)2

− (1− α) (1− β)

a (θ)2 − (a (θ) (1− (1 + λ)x))2

.
This expression illustrates the properties of the adjustment market: it is
ex post efficient, except for the low type when no production failure oc-
curs (probability (1− α) (1− β)), where it creates an information distortion
a (θ)2 − (a (θ) (1− (1 + λ)x))2

.
Welfare variation The previous analysis yields
2 (b+ c) (W a −Wna) = Eθ

Eµ

(a (θ)− cµ)2

− (a (θ)− cE [µ])2

+(1− α)
 (a (θ)− cE [µ])2 − (a (θ) (1− x)− cE [µ]
− (1− β)

a (θ)2 − (a (θ) (1− (1 + λ)x))2
  .
The first term corresponds to the gain from ex post efficiency. The second
term corresponds to the difference in information distortions.
The sign of (Wa −Wna) varies with all the parameters of the problem.
To simplify the analysis, we fix α = 12 and c = b. Therefore x =
a(θ¯)−a(θ)
a(θ) .
We also have,
λ =
β
2 (1− β) ⇔ 1− β =
1
1 + 2λ
.
λ (.) is half the odds ratio. It increases with the probability of failure
β, λ (0) = 0 and limβ→1 λ (β) = +∞. As λ decreases, the probability of
failure decreases, hence the expected value of the information distortion in
Wa increases.
Since inverse demand and marginal cost are linear, the gain from ex post
19
efficiency takes a very simple form:
Eθ

Eµ

(a (θ)− cµ)2

− (a (θ)− cE [µ])2

= Eθ [var ((a (θ)− cµ))] = c2var (µ) .
Suppose the shock µ is distributed according to a Bernoulli distribution:
µ = 0 with probability (1− β), and µ = µ¯ with probability β, hence E [µ] =
βµ¯. Then,
var (µ)
a (θ)2
=
β (1− β) µ¯2
a (θ)2
=

E [µ]
a (θ)
2 1− β
β
=
y2
2λ
.
For a given λ, the value of ex post efficiency increases with (the square of)
expected cost y.
With these notation and assumptions, we now examine the sign of (W a −Wna)
as a function of (c, λ, x, y). We have
∆W
def
=
2(b+ c) (Wa −Wna)
a (θ)2
=
c2y2
2λ
− xy + λx
2
(2 + λx)
1 + 2λ
.
As previously mentioned, its first term corresponds to the welfare gain
from ex post efficiency. The net welfare loss due to information distortions is
the sum of two terms. The negative first term (−xy) captures the interaction
between information and production distortions when no adjustment market
is present, that shows that the marginal welfare impact of the information
distortion (i.e., ∂W
na
∂x
) is proportional to the expected cost y. The second
term

λx
2
(2+λx)
1+2λ

is increasing in x: as the information distortion increases,
the value of opening the adjustment market to customers increases.
Opening the adjustment market reduces welfare if and only if ∆W < 0.
Thus, we examine the sign of ∆W . Consider ∆W = 0 as a quadratic
equation in y. Its discriminant is
D = x

x− c2 (2 + λx)
1 + 2λ

.
If c2 is high enough, D < 0, hence ∆W (y) > 0: if the efficiency gain is high
enough, opening the adjustment market to load curtailment always improves
welfare.
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On the other hand, if D > 0, ∆W (y) = 0 admits two positive roots
y1 = 4λ

x−
√
D

< y2 = 4λ

x+
√
D

.
Thus, ∆W (y) < 0 for y ∈ (y1, y2), provided (1− x− y) > 0. This analysis
is formalized below:
Proposition 2 Suppose the consumer has private information on her type.
If
c2 >
1 + 2λ
2 + 3λ
≡ γ (λ) ,
then opening the adjustment market always improve welfare. If
c2 <
1 + 2λ
2 + 9λ
≡ δ (λ) ,
there exists xmin < xmax <
1
1+λ such that opening the adjustment market
to energy demanders reduces welfare for all (x, y) ∈ H = (xmin, xmax) ×
(y1 (x) , y2 (x)).
Proof. The details of the proof are presented in Appendix C.
If the efficiency gain is lower than the threshold δ (λ), there exists a
well-defined set H for which ∆W (x, y) < 0. The function δ (λ) is decreasing
in λ. Suppose c
2
λ
< δ (λ). If x = 0, there is no private information, hence
letting customers enter the adjustment market increases welfare. This is true
by continuity around x = 0. If the information distortion is high enough,
specifically if x ≥ xmin, it outweighs the efficiency gain, hence accepting load
shedding in the adjustment market reduces welfare. The constraint that
the low type customer be served puts an upper bound on the information
distortion, specifically x < xmax.
Finally, if c
2
λ ∈ [δ (λ) , γ (λ)], there exists a set for which ∆W (x, y) < 0,
although it is not as clearly defined as when c2 < δ (λ), hence we do not
describe it.
This simple model has shown that, when suppliers have perfect informa-
tion on consumers, they can exert first-degree price discrimination, which is
good in terms of efficiency and bad in terms of fairness. By contrast, when
they only have a statistical knowledge on consumers’ types, they can just
implement second-best discrimination: they propose a menu made of two
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contracts and each consumer chooses the one he prefers. An efficiency loss
(for the “bad type”) and more fairness (for the “good type”) ensue. Between
these bounds, it is a matter of trade-off between the efficiency concern and
the fairness concern. In some countries, regulators only worry about com-
petition; others are also in charge of consumers’ protection.
5 Regulatory issues
The need to balance the electric power system in real time to manage the
non-storability of electricity is the main explanation for vertical integration
in the sector, either structurally or contractually. Non-storability also ex-
plains the secondary role traditionally given to demand in the physical bal-
ancing of the power system. However, the inclusion of Information and Com-
munication Technologies (ICT) in "smart networks"suggests drastic changes
in the near term, providing consumers with a more active role, thus poten-
tially making the whole system more efficient ... and raising new challenges
for regulators.
Every consumer can be disconnected at low damage for dates, durations
and quantities varying with her equipment and preferences.13 The barrier
was the cost of implementation. The installation of ICT devices for the
remote control of consumption equipment by specialized service providers
overcomes this obstacle. It is now technically possible to produce large-scale
distributed load-shedding. Additionally, to meet environmental constraints
and requirements in energy saving, the active participation of consumers is
increasingly seen as politically desirable, especially voluntary demand re-
sponse.
With the new role given to consumers in electricity markets, we have
seen that the demand side must be viewed as behaving more strategically.
Market rules and regulations must then be designed to accommodate this
evolution. Hereafter, we highlight four problems that must be solved by
regulators.
13For an overview on how to implement demand response, see Borenstein et al. (2002).
Torriti et al. (2010) give details about demand response experiences in some European
countries.
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5.1 Paying for good resold
In our analysis, we have assumed that the customers pay for the whole
quantity q they contract upon. In the second stage of the game, they decide
whether to consume electricity or, when energy shortage occurs, to sell a
fraction of the Megawatt-hours they have acquired. Purchasing a good be-
fore reselling it is common sense ... for economists, but maybe less for lawyers
and politicians. For example, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission in
the United States chose a demand-response mechanism forcing Independent
System Operators and Regional Transmission Organizations to pay retail
customers the full market price for their reduced consumption, without off-
setting the purchase price of this reduced consumption. Many academics
have pointed out this ruling is inconsistent with economic analysis.14 Chao
(2010) shows how voluntary load-shedding helps to correct the inefficiency
of time unvarying electricity prices, under the condition that consumers pay
the same retail price for the electricity they consume and the electricity they
resell.15 This is the first necessary layer of regulation for demand response:
ex ante, the regulatory authority must impose that consumers are paid the
adjustment price for not consuming only if they have purchased the energy
they resell.16 Otherwise, demand response will be obviously excessive since
consumers would be paid for selling something obtained for free.
14On the FERC case, see USCA 2012a, 2012b and 2014. We thank an anonymous
referee of the Journal for the information about the recent overturn of the FERC decision
by the US Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit Court. The Court first invokes legal
reasons: "FERC can regulate practices affecting the wholesale market ..., provided the
Commission is not directly regulating a matter subject to state control, such as the retail
market." Happily for the economist, it also refers to economic reasons: "Alternatively,
even if we assume FERC had statutory authority to execute the Rule in the first place,
[its Rule] would still fail because it was arbitrary and capricious". And the Court explains
that the FERC decision would overcompensate demand response resources because it
requires that demand resources be paid the full marginal price plus be allowed to retain
the savings associated with the provider’s avoided retail generation cost.
15As Ruff (2002) says " Normal markets allow consumers to sell what they do not
consume as long as they own it, but no rational market pays consumers for not consuming
what they do not own, even if they can prove that they would have bought it but didn’t.
Paying somebody because they might have bought more but didn’t is as illogical, unfair,
and inefficient as buying the Brooklyn Bridge from somebody who thought about buying
it but decided to sell it instead." See also Crampes and Léautier (2012).
16On the PJM demand response payment rules, see Hogan (2009).
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5.2 The market power of aggregators
Thousands, and progressively millions of consumers will have the possibility
to intervene in the adjustment market by reducing their demand below the
contracted quantity at a price determined by all the bids of reserve produc-
ers and ready-to-renounce customers. However, because of their small scale,
most customers will not do it individually. They will rather choose to be
connected to a remote operator, able to monitor some domestic appliances
and industrial machines for given duration, at some important dates where
the electric system needs to be rebalanced. Controlling the possibility to
disconnect 1 kW at one million locations gives the equivalent capacity of
a nuclear generation plant, with the additional advantage of time and spa-
tial flexibility.17 In this aggregation business, there are strong economies of
size (scale, scope, density) as well as indirect network externalities (com-
patibility, technological complementarity, potential for two-sided payment).
This means that the supply of load-shedding will most likely be made by a
small number of large firms. In all network activities, take-off is a delicate
phase, but when successful, the operator can harvest huge rents thanks to
its dominant position. Maintaining a minimal dose of competition without
impairing the gains of networking is a difficult task that must be prepared
beforehand.18
5.3 Use of collected information
Energy consumers are very heterogenous: depending of their type (industry,
business, household), size, location, technical characteristics of appliances
and buildings, they consume large or small, regular or irregular quantities,
at peak or off-peak periods. Additionally, depending on the equipment they
have installed to produce local energy (photovoltaic panels, wind turbines),
they can be net demanders or net suppliers of energy on the grid. The prob-
lem is that, electricity being non storable, producing 1 MWh has a much
higher cost when it must be supplied in one hour than when the consumer
needs 100 kW per hour for 10 hours. Thus, having a good knowledge of con-
sumption profiles allows to install a cheaper and more reliable production
17The building of a load-reduction "merit order" based on priority service by aggregators
is clearly exposed in Oren (2013).
18For a good checklist, see Shapiro (1996).
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mix. Unfortunately, traditional meters only give information on aggregated
consumptions, sometimes for the last 6 months. Thanks to smart meters,
load-shedding protocols and, more generally, demand-response programs,
large quantities of precise information will be collected from consumption
places and processed to be used by energy suppliers and load-shedding agge-
gators. This raises two questions. One is that consumers will progressively
lose the informational advantage we have presented in the former sections;
from our results, it is good news for efficiency, and bad news for equity since
suppliers will be able to extract more rents from consumers. Regulators will
probably have to intervene to limit the market power of energy suppliers,
except if we can enter a world of strong competition in retail. The second
question is the trading of data collected on consumers’ behavior. Will it be
legal to sell data on consumption profiles? Will data on profiles be viewed
as an essential facility for new entrants?19 Again, it is better to prepare
regulations before the problem becomes urgent to solve.
5.4 Bundling
In our model, customers who want to exert their rights of reducing consump-
tion have a direct access to the adjustment market. Actually, as suggested
above, for most consumers load-shedding will be supplied by specialized
operators. Then the question is whether energy suppliers could also be
load-shedding aggregators. There are good arguments in favor of this solu-
tion. One is that the information necessary for proposing a retail contract
are very similar to those necessary to decide on energy savings. Forcing
two operators to collect the same data separately would be a costly duplica-
tion. A second argument is that the conditions for future demand reduction
can be negotiated simultaneously with the retail contract, again saving on
transaction costs. Forbidding energy suppliers to propose shedding services
would clearly be socially counterproductive.
However, antitrust authorities will have to monitor the terms of dual
contracts to be sure that no abuse of dominant position will be exerted. To
19 In September 2014, the French Competition Authority ordered GDF SUEZ,
a big energy supplier, to grant its competitors access to parts of its database
relating to consumers with regulated gas tariffs. The main argument is that
the historical database and the marketing resources inherited from GDF’s former
monopoly status are necessary tools for the new entrants to develop. See details at
www.autoritedelaconcurrence.fr/user/standard.php?id_rub=592&id_article=2420
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limit the risks of exclusion of firms proposing one single service, the solution
is to accept mixed bundling, that is to oblige firms who can propose the
two services to offer them both under a stand-alone format and in a dual
contract. Since tying the two services is a source of cost savings, the bundling
of energy retail and consumption reduction must be evaluated according to
a rule of reason by the competition authorities.20
The main difficulty for the authority will be, within a tied offer, to dis-
entangle the price of the two services to assess the value of each.21 The
task of the energy regulator will rather be to guarantee ex ante that all
efficient demand responses are possible, whoever the concerned agents (the
producer responsible for energy shortage, the energy retailer and the opera-
tor in charge of demand reduction can be three separated entities) and that
financial flows are cleared in a fair way.22
6 Conclusion
This article examines the participation of consumers in adjustment markets
for electricity, which enable market participants to respond to random sup-
ply shocks occurring after quantities have been contracted. Under perfect
competition, opening the adjustment market to consumers always increase
ex post efficiency, hence welfare, as expected. However, this result is not
robust to strategic behavior by consumers who hold private information on
their value for electricity. We prove that under such information asymme-
try, allowing consumers to enter the adjustment market may reduce welfare.
This arises because suppliers limit the information rents they must abandon
by proposing inefficient ex ante retail contracts. If the value of ex post effi-
ciency gains due to consumers’ participation is low, whereas the information
distortion is high, the overall net effect is a welfare decrease.
Demand response will continue to generate a large academic literature.
This work can be expanded in at least two directions. First, it will be
important to determine empirically the magnitude of private information on
demand for different classes of customers. For example, residential users may
have highly predictable demand, hence the extent of information asymmetry
20See Tirole (2005) for an overview on competition policy in tying cases.
21See Hogan (2009) on the PJM rules providing incentives for demand response.
22Crampes and Léautier (2012) show the financial accounts concerned when rebalancing
an energy shortage with a mix of additional production and demand reduction.
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may be limited, and their participation in adjustment markets beneficial. On
the other hand, industrial or professional users may have more unpredictable
demand, hence information asymmetry may be more of an issue.
Second, if, as seems to be the case, a fraction of customers do have private
information on their consumption, research will have to expand the analysis
presented in this article to a broader — and more realistic — set of contracts,
for example, contracts that allow customers to purchase any quantity up to
a limit (controlled by their meter) at a fixed unit price, or contracts that
enable customers to buy different blocks of power at different prices.
A No demand participation in adjustment
Denote q∗ (θ, µ) the ex post efficient production, defined by equality of mar-
ginal value and marginal cost
P (q∗ (θ, µ) , θ) = c (q∗ (θ, µ) + µ) .
Full differentiation of the above condition yields
∂q∗
∂µ
=
c′
Pq − c′ < 0⇔ 1 +
∂q∗
∂µ
=
Pq
Pq − c′ > 0
since Pq < 0 and c
′ ≥ 0. The optimal production decreases with the size of
the shock µ. However, (q∗ (θ, µ) + µ) increases with the shock µ.
Define µˆ the production shock such that c (q∗ (θ, µˆ) + µˆ) = Eµ [c (q (θ) + µ)].
For µ ≤ µˆ, c (q∗ (θ, µ) + µ) ≤ c (q∗ (θ, µˆ) + µˆ) since (q∗ (θ, µ) + µ) and c (.)
are increasing. Thus
P (q∗ (θ, µ) , θ) = c (q∗ (θ, µ) + µ) ≤ c (q∗ (θ, µˆ) + µˆ) = Eµ [c (q (θ) + µ)] = P (q (θ) , θ)
⇔
q (θ) ≤ q∗ (θ, µ) .
27
B Comparative statics on the adjustment market
Equilibrium:
pa − S′q (q − qca, θ) = 0
pa −C ′ (q + qsa) = 0
qca + q
s
a = µ
Total differentiation:
dpa − S′′qqdq + S
′′
qqdq
c
a − S
′′
qθdθ = 0
dpa −C′′dq −C ′′dqsa = 0
dqca + dq
s
a = dµ
or  1 S
′′
qq 0
1 0 −C′′
0 1 1
×
 dpadqca
dqsa
 =
 S
′′
qqdq + S
′′
qθdθ
C ′′dq
dµ

Determinant of the full system:
∆ = C ′′ − S′′qq > 0
Effects on pa :
dpa =

S
′′
qqdq + S
′′
qθdθ S
′′
qq 0
C′′dq 0 −C ′′
dµ 1 1

∆
=
−S′′qqC ′′dµ+C ′′

S
′′
qqdq + S
′′
qθdθ

−C ′′S′′qqdq
∆
∂pa
∂µ
=
−S′′qqC ′′
∆
> 0
∂pa
∂θ
=
C′′S
′′
qθ
∆
> 0
∂pa
∂q
= 0
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Effects on qca :
dqca =

1 S
′′
qqdq + S
′′
qθdθ 0
1 C ′′dq −C ′′
0 dµ 1

∆
=
C ′′dq +C ′′dµ−

S
′′
qqdq + S
′′
qθdθ

∆
∂qca
∂µ
=
C ′′
∆
> 0
∂qca
∂θ
= −S
′′
qθ
∆
< 0
∂qca
∂q
= 1
Effects on qsa :
dqsa =

1 S
′′
qq S
′′
qqdq + S
′′
qθdθ
1 0 C ′′dq
0 1 dµ

∆
=
S
′′
qqdq + S
′′
qθdθ −C ′′dq − S
′′
qqdµ
∆
∂qsa
∂µ
=
−S′′qq
∆
> 0
∂qsa
∂θ
=
S
′′
qθ
∆
> 0
∂qsa
∂q
= −1
C Welfare comparison in the linear case
Recall that conditions (9) and (10) impose x < min

1
1+λ , 1− y

. We first
prove that if c2 > γ (λ), the discriminant D is negative for all x < 11+λ .
Thus, ∆W (x, y) > 0 for all admissible (x, y). If c2 < γ (λ), there exists
a unique xmin <
1
1+λ such that D > 0 for all x ∈

xmin,
1
1+λ

. We then
prove that, if c2 < δ (λ), g (xmin) = 1 − xmin − y2 (xmin) > 0. Since g (.) is
decreasing and g

1
1+λ

> 0, there exists a unique xmax ∈

xmin,
1
1+λ

such
that g (x) ≥ 0 for all x ∈ (xmin, xmax). The results then follows.
Consider the second degree equation with respect to y
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c2y2
2λ
− xy + λx
2
(2 + λx)
1 + 2λ
= 0.
Its discriminant is
D = x

x− c2 (2 + λx)
1 + 2λ

.
Define h (x) = x− c2 (2+λx)1+2λ . Observe that h (0) = − 2c
2
1+2λ < 0. A necessary
and sufficient condition for h (x) > 0 for some value of x lower than 11+λ is
h

1
1 + λ

=
1
1 + λ
−c2

2 + λ1+λ

1 + 2λ
> 0⇔ 1
1 + λ

1− c22 + 3λ
1 + 2λ

⇔ c2 < 1 + 2λ
2 + 3λ
.
Furthermore,
h
′
(x) = 1− λc
2
1 + 2λ
> 0⇔ c2 < 1 + 2λ
λ
,
which holds since 12+3λ <
1
λ
(this is equivalent to 2+3λ > λ⇔ 2 (1 + λ) > 0
which is true). Thus, c2 < 1+2λ2+3λ is a necessary and sufficient condition for
the existence of xmin <
1
1+λ such that h (x) > 0 for all x ∈

xmin,
1
1+λ

.
Specifically,
h (xmin) = 0⇔ xmin = c2 (2 + λxmin)
1 + 2λ
=
2c2
1+2λ
1− λc21+2λ
=
2c2
1 + 2λ− λc2 .
Therefore, if c2 < 1+2λ2+3λ and x ∈

xmin,
1
1+λ

, ∆W (y) = 0 admits two
positive roots
y1 (x) = 4λ

x−
√
D

< y2 (x) = 4λ

x+
√
D

.
Define g (x) = 1−x−y2 (x). We are looking for values of x ∈

xmin,
1
1+λ

such that g (x) > 0. We first prove that y2 (x) is increasing:
y
′
2 (x) = 4λ

1 +
1
2
√
D
dD
dx

and
dD
dx
= x− c2 (2 + λx)
1 + 2λ
+ x

1− λc
2
1 + 2λ

=
D
x
+ x

1− λc
2
1 + 2λ

> 0
since x > xmin and c
2 < 1+2λ2+3λ <
1+2λ
λ . Thus, y2 (.) is increasing and g (.) is
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decreasing. Observe that
g

1
1 + λ

= 1− 1
1 + λ
− 4λ

1
1 + λ
+

D

1
1 + λ

= − 3λ
1 + λ
− 4λ

D

1
1 + λ

< 0
and
g (xmin) = 1− xmin − 4λxmin = 1− (1 + 4λ)xmin = 1 + 2λ− λc
2 − 2c2 (1 + 4λ)
1 + 2λ− λc2
=
1+ 2λ− c2 (2 + 9λ)
1 + 2λ− λc2 .
Thus,
c2 <
1 + 2λ
2 + 9λ
⇔ g (xmin) > 0,
hence there exists a unique xmax ∈

xmin,
1
1+λ

such that g (xmax) = 0.
This yields the result since 12+9λ <
1
2+3λ .
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